2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

18 April 2005

Original: English

New York, 2-27 May 2005

Implementation of article VI

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

This report is prepared in accordance with subparagraph 12 of paragraph 15 of the section of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference concerning article VI of the Treaty, and deals with measures that have been taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in step 12 of the 13 practical steps, provides an essential element to ascertain the implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the objectivity of our analysis on the progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament would be best served through adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the review strengthening process.

2. One of the important elements of the step 12 is that the 2000 Review Conference recalled the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 in conjunction with the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. As the Court stipulated in its advisory opinion in 1996 "there exists an obligation to pursue, in good faith, and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". The Islamic Republic of Iran, therefore, believes that, while reporting on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty is important, it shall not substitute the fulfilment of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under article VI. Thirty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the obligations under article VI have yet to be fulfilled.

I. Iran's approach towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty

3. Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969 and ratified it in February 1970. In June 1973, in accordance with paragraph 1 of article III of the Treaty, Iran concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ratifying the Treaty on the Non-

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Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before its entry into force and early conclusion of the Safeguards Agreement, as well as signing the Additional Protocol, clearly demonstrates our long-standing support and commitment as a non-nuclear-weapon State to this fundamental instrument. During the past three decades, Iran has done its utmost to achieve the objectives and purposes of the Treaty. In 1974, Iran was the first country in the Middle East region that initiated the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was followed by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. In 1995, the Islamic Republic of Iran actively participated in the Review and Extension Conference and joined others in supporting the indefinite extension of the Treaty, with the hope that the agreed package would pave the way for the early elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all provisions of the Treaty. Iran's position to denounce the nuclear option, as a matter of principle, and place its peaceful nuclear facilities under the full scope-safeguards agreement is a clear manifestation of our commitment to a strong Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran considers the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defence doctrine, not only because of our commitment to our contractual obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but in fact because of a sober strategic calculation. They do not add to Iran's security nor do they help rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in Iran's supreme interests.

5. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the "rights and obligations" enshrined in the Treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages the Treaty's universality and full implementation.

6. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, as agreed in the 2000 Review Conference, should be vigorously pursued by nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, no action shall be made by any State, in particular nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of those obligations. Regrettably, the new nuclear doctrine of the United States, through development of new types of nuclear weapons and setting rationales for the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and naming non-nuclear-weapon States as the targets of such new inhuman weapons is a flagrant violation of international law, obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives, as well as the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States in the 2000 Review Conference. Furthermore, by continuing the deployment of hundreds of nuclear weapons in other countries and training the air forces of those countries to deliver those weapons in the framework of military alliances, the United States is still in violation of its obligations under article I of the Treaty, which stipulates that "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons ...".

II. Measures taken to implement article VI

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran has actively participated in international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed our full support. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions such as resolution 59/102 entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", resolution 59/63, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of Middle East", resolution 59/64, "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", resolution 59/75, "Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", resolution 59/77, "Nuclear disarmament", resolution 59/79, "Reducing nuclear danger", resolution 59/81, "Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty", resolution 59/106, "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" and resolution 59/109, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" and other relevant resolutions adopted in the United Nations and other international forums.

8. In line with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, in various forums including the International Court of Justice, made its position clear that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law and is therefore illegal. The Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously supported the resolution adopted annually since 1999 entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons".

9. Iran considers the early establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament, with a mandate to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a nuclear weapons convention, to be a concrete step relating to the materialization of nuclear disarmament.

10. The Islamic Republic of Iran played a prominent role during the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, hoping that the conclusion of the Treaty would prevent the qualitative as well as quantitative development of nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a signatory of the Treaty is an active member of the Preparatory Commission and hosts five International Monitoring System stations. The 2000 Conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed among 13 practical steps to a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its serious concern that the United States decided to accelerate "testing readiness" to enable it to reduce the time needed for resuming underground nuclear tests to 18 months. This will clearly put into question the United States commitment to the continuation of its already declared testing moratorium.

11. In addition to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Subsidiary Arrangements concluded with the IAEA, the Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on 18 December 2003 and is provisionally implementing it. We regard this as another confidence-building measure to reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All these measures have been taken in a situation where negligence with regard to the unsafe-guarded facilities and the nuclear weapons

programme of Israel, which enjoys the tacit support of the United States, continues to threaten regional and international peace and security.

12. Owing to the significant role that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones plays in achieving a world entirely free from nuclear weapons, in 1974 Iran initiated the resolution for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980, this resolution has been adopted annually by consensus in the General Assembly. However, Israel, confident of the political and military support of the United States and through its persistent rejection of accession to any international disarmament instrument, and in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, remains the main obstacle to the establishment of such a zone.

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Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

In accordance with subparagraph 7 of paragraph 16 (regional issues) of the section of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference concerning article VII of the Treaty, which deals with steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran reports the following:

1. Iran first initiated the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important disarmament measure in the region of the Middle East in 1974, followed by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. Since 1980, the General Assembly of the United Nations has annually adopted, by consensus, a resolution on this issue. Continuous adoption of this resolution at the General Assembly is the manifestation of the global support for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

2. As a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to its international undertakings and believes that this international instrument is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to this Treaty, in particular in the region of the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. At present, Israel is the only non-party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region. Despite repeated calls by the international community demonstrated in the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, related resolutions of the General Assembly as well as of the IAEA and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Israel, confident of the political and military support of the United States, has neither acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nor placed its unwarranted nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Israel has not even declared its intention to accede to the Treaty. Israel's clandestine nuclear activities, with the support of the United States, seriously threaten both regional peace and security and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

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

3. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed the importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Owing to the significant provisions of this resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran and other States in the region truly expect that this resolution will be swiftly implemented, especially by its sponsors, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as depositories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

4. Unconditional adherence by Israel to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and conclusion of a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA would, undoubtedly, lead to the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Neglecting the commitments undertaken by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the adoption of this important resolution can only embolden Israel to continue to remain a source of threat and instability in the Middle East by flouting the wishes of the international community and remaining outside of the fold of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the full-scope safeguards regime. In this context, we believe that national reports that do not address the negative implications of Israel's intransigence to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, like the one presented by Australia in the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/8), are not as effective as they ought to be with regard to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

5. In implementing its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and specifically articles II and III of the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran states that all its nuclear facilities are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Furthermore, to contribute to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, Iran has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. It has also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Iran's high record of accession, among the Middle East countries, to the non-proliferation and disarmament instruments is not only a clear manifestation of our firm commitment to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation, but is also evidence of our dedicated efforts towards the noble goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its bilateral and multilateral disarmament dialogues with other States parties to the Treaty, in particular with some nuclear-weapon States and members of the European Union, as well as in the joint statement of 21 October 2003 issued by Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, has always urged their active contribution towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the firm belief that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, especially in the Middle East, should be a top priority on the agenda of all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular nuclear-weapon States. There should be greater pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, promptly and without conditions, and to place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope

safeguards to pave the way for the long-sought goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the opinion that, pending the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, no country of the region should develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing, on their territories or on territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and they should refrain from action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international resolutions and documents relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

9. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the Conferences to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a significant role in the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Review Conference of 2005 should establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to consider this issue and make concrete recommendations on urgent and practical steps for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Canada also voted in favour of the resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". At the United Nations, Canada has called for full adherence and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by States parties in the region, and has urged the four[1] States in the region that have not signed or ratified comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to do so as soon as possible. Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conference in September 2004. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding Additional Protocols to their respective safeguards agreements, thereby demonstrating greater openness and transparency. Canada fully supports efforts by the IAEA to convene, as soon as possible, a forum on the application of safeguards, in which countries from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions about comprehensive verification arrangements and other confidence-building measures that could contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

2. Canada shares the serious international concerns about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. While Canada recognizes that Iran has a right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Iran has failed to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle. In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered on 14 March 2005, Canada's Foreign Minister reaffirmed that Iran's extensive past undeclared nuclear activities, together with its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, have resulted in strong suspicions that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions. He said that permanent cessation of Iran's uranium enrichment and other proliferation-sensitive activities is

[1] Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman (signed on 28 June 2001 but not in force).

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the only acceptable objective guarantee of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. On 22 February 2005, Canada's Prime Minister said to a summit of NATO leaders that Iran must be encouraged to end its nuclear weapons programme. He expressed Canada's hope that the challenge could be addressed through dialogue and diplomacy, but emphasized that the international community must be prepared to stand behind its words with stronger measures if necessary. Iran's extensive past undeclared nuclear activities, which raise important questions about Iran's commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, were clearly not in conformance with its safeguards obligations, a matter that Canada believes the IAEA should acknowledge and report to the Security Council as required by the Agency's statute. Canada has also encouraged Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol and has actively supported IAEA safeguards activities in Iran.

3. Canada was deeply concerned by the revelation in late 2003 of Libya's nuclear weapon programme and other undeclared nuclear activities. Canada strongly supported the decision of the Libyan Government to end all nuclear weapons-related activities and the efforts of the IAEA to verify that important decision. That resoluteness to disarm in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, together with Libya's commitment to accept enhanced inspections via the Additional Protocol and to respect fully all its disarmament obligations, were important steps reinforcing regional and international security.

4. When explaining its support for the resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", Canada urged Israel, "in the crucial months leading up to the 2005 Review Conference, to take the necessary first steps to adhering to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State". This statement is in conformity with the Canadian Government's 1999 disarmament and non-proliferation policy statement, which called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to separate its civilian and military fuel cycles and to place its civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. It also conforms with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which calls on all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

Article I

1. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this respect, Canada views reductions by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons inventories and the diminishment of the political and military value ascribed to nuclear weapons as key to halting and discouraging further nuclear weapons proliferation. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 2004 the Prime Minister of Canada reaffirmed Canada's long-standing position that non-proliferation and disarmament remain fundamental pillars of the United Nations commitment to international peace and security.

2. The Prime Minister also highlighted Canadian concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-State actors, and reaffirmed Canada's long-standing commitment to strengthened international efforts to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not spread to States or terrorists prepared to use them under any circumstances. Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to establish a more effective basis for impeding and stopping shipments of, inter alia, nuclear weapons material and technology flowing illegally to and from States and non-State actors, consistent with national legal authorities and international law. Canada hosts a Proliferation Security Initiative website www.proliferationsecurity.info, and in April 2004, hosted a working group meeting for Proliferation Security Initiative operational experts.

Article II

3. Canada continues to abide by its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. This

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commitment is implemented domestically through Canada's Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000 and corresponding regulations.

4. Canada also calls on other non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, acquire or seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosive devices. On 22 February 2005, Canada's Prime Minister said to a summit of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders that Iran must be encouraged to end its nuclear weapons programme. He expressed Canada's hope that the challenge could be addressed through dialogue and diplomacy, but emphasized that we must be prepared to stand behind our words with stronger measures if necessary. In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament delivered on 14 March 2005, Canada's Foreign Minister reaffirmed that Iran's extensive past undeclared nuclear activities, together with its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, have resulted in strong suspicions that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions. He said that permanent cessation of Iran's uranium enrichment and other proliferation sensitive activities is the only acceptable objective guarantee of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Article III

5. Pursuant to Article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The IAEA has provided annually a positive conclusion concerning the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Canada pursuant to this agreement. In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards, Canada concluded a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, which entered into force on 8 September 2000. Canada continues to cooperate with the IAEA with regard to the Protocol's implementation. During the last year, efforts have concentrated on: addressing questions and inconsistencies identified by the IAEA; facilitating complementary access under the Protocol; reviewing existing procedures and establishing new procedures with industry and with the Agency to ensure effective implementation of safeguards commitments; updating safeguards equipment at Canadian facilities and preparing for the establishment of remote monitoring capabilities; developing and testing a new approach for transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit Canadian deuterium-uranium reactor stations; ensuring that safeguards implementation at our uranium conversion facilities is consistent with the new Agency requirements; and preparing for the transition to integrated safeguards. With respect to the latter, Canada anticipates that the IAEA will soon be in a position to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada, a necessary condition for the transition to integrated safeguards. In addition, through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme Canada contributed to the development of advanced safeguards equipment and techniques aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency's safeguards. This effort resulted in a contribution of approximately Can $1.8m over the last year. At the IAEA and at the United Nations General Assembly, Canada has urged States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and protocols additional to their safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible.

6. Consonant with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the

processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Canada will only authorize nuclear cooperation with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities, and have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This policy has been in place since 1976. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with respect to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. Canada's export control legislation includes a catch-all provision. Canada's national system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. All these measures serve to facilitate peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation without contributing to proliferation.

7. In response to the threat posed to the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Canada continues to cooperate actively with other like-minded States in a variety of international forums to develop new measures aimed at further strengthening the regime, particularly with regard to the transfer of sensitive technologies associated with the production of special fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons purposes, and the suspension of nuclear cooperation in cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Article IV

8. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada maintains a robust nuclear power programme. It is the world's largest exporter of uranium, and is a world leader in the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications. Canada believes that nuclear energy can make an important contribution to prosperity and sustainable development, while also addressing concerns about climate change, for those countries that choose to use nuclear energy, and to this end has nuclear cooperation agreements in force covering 42 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology. Since the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee, Canada has participated in policy and technical consultations on implementation of nuclear cooperation agreements with seven of its bilateral partners. Canada supports the IAEA Technical Cooperation programme, and for several years has met or exceeded the rate of attainment for voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.

9. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consonant with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV. In this regard, a Canadian expert participated in the recent IAEA ad hoc experts group studying new multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives.

Article V

10. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that provisions of article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Canada signed that Treaty on 24 September 1996, when it opened for signature, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 December 1998. Canada was the first State signatory to that Treaty to sign a facility agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on 19 October 1998. Consistent with Canada's call on all States that have not yet done so to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, particularly the States listed in Annex 2, Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to all his counterparts in non-ratified States in advance of the third Article XIV Conference to Facilitate Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held from 3 to 5 September 2003, urging their countries to sign and/or ratify the Treaty. Canada reiterated this message at the Conference.

11. In September 2002 and again in September 2004, Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs signed a Joint Declaration that reiterated support for the Treaty and called for its early entry into force. In February 2004, Canada agreed to be included on a contact list of countries that will assist the Special Coordinator for Entry into Force in promoting activities at the regional level that promote entry into force of the Treaty. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored the resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which called for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty and urged the maintenance of unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapons test explosions until entry into force is achieved. Canada places a priority on the establishment of the Treaty's verification system and, as such, is a leader among member States in contributing resources, equipment and expertise to the development of the Treaty's International Monitoring System (IMS). Most recently, the radionuclide station in Resolute, Nunavut (RN15), was certified on 22 December 2004. Furthermore, at the August 2004 Noble Gas Workshop in Strassoldo, Italy, Canada played a lead role in building a consensus to continue an experiment to install additional noble gas detection equipment at 40 radionuclide stations and laboratories.

Article VI

12. In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament made on 14 March, Canada's Foreign Minister said that a reaffirmation of the goal of nuclear disarmament and a renewed commitment to achieving this goal should be a key conclusion of the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Canada continues to take very seriously the obligation of article VI and the commitments agreed upon in the 1995 Principles and Objectives and in the 13 steps

at the 2000 Review Conference. These have been at the forefront of a number of activities and statements.

Steps 1 and 2

13. Canada's action in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the moratorium on nuclear testing is described above under article V implementation.

Steps 3 and 4

14. In his speech to the General Assembly, Canada's Prime Minister noted how the United Nations Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree on a work plan since 1998, and called on the Conference to get back to productive work. In the First Committee, Canada tabled a resolution calling for negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The adoption of that resolution by all but a handful of States signals strong international support for the negotiation of a multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials. Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs reiterated the priority Canada attaches to early negotiation of such a Treaty in a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 14 March. He also supported the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.

Step 5

15. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Canada joined the consensus in support of the resolution entitled "Bilateral strategic arms reductions and the new strategic framework". Canada believes that codification, verifiability, transparency and irreversibility should apply to the reduction of nuclear arsenals and facilitates their elimination.

Step 6

16. Canada reiterated its call on nuclear-weapon States to securely reduce and dismantle their nuclear weapons arsenals in an irreversible and verifiable manner at the fifty-ninth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. At that session, Canada voted in favour of the resolutions entitled "Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" and "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Canada also called for a separate vote and voted in favour of paragraph 1 of the resolution entitled "Follow up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons", in order to support the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

17. Canada supports the reduced salience of nuclear weapons and the significant reduction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's nuclear forces that has taken place since the end of the cold war. As a member of NATO, Canada continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives through a continuous step-by-step approach. In 2004, Canada actively contributed, during NATO discussions, to the updated basic fact sheets, "NATO's Position Regarding Nuclear Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related

Issues" and "NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment", which represent a contribution to transparency by NATO in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons context.

Step 9

18. Canada's support for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons was expressed by our vote in favour of the resolution entitled "Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

19. Under the scope of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Canada will contribute up to Can $1 billion over the next ten years to non-proliferation, disarmament and counter-terrorism cooperation projects in Russia and certain other newly independent States of the former Soviet Union. On nuclear-related projects, Canada is contributing $32 million to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership to safely and securely manage spent nuclear fuel (including highly enriched uranium) from submarines in Northern Russia. Canada is contributing $24.4 million to dismantle 3 decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, an initial step in a $120 million programme that aims to dismantle a total of 12 nuclear-powered submarines over four years. In addition, Canada has contributed $4 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund to strengthen nuclear and radiological security throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. As well, Canada is contributing $18 million per year to the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow to fund various research projects and other programmes and activities and thereby redirect former weapons scientists towards sustainable peaceful employment opportunities.

Step 10

20. For the disposition of fissile materials, under the Global Partnership programme, Canada has pledged $65 million towards Russia's plutonium disposition programme, which will dispose of material for thousands of nuclear weapons. On 30 March 2005, Canada's Foreign Minister signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States Secretary of Energy to assist with the permanent closure of one of the last operating weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in Russia. Under this memorandum of understanding, Canada will contribute $9 million (US$ 7 million) to the United States Department of Energy's elimination of weapons-grade plutonium Production programme.

Step 11

21. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Canada tabled a resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", which was adopted by consensus. This resolution calls for the establishment of a panel of experts in 2006 that will report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session. In the interests of general and complete disarmament, Canada is also a State party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Outer Space

Treaty. Canada has provided financial support to mine clearance and related activities in over 25 States, as well as to small arms and light weapons disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, collection and destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Africa and Asia.

Step 12

22. Since the 2000 Review Conference, Canada has submitted three working papers on how to carry forward the reporting commitment, with a view to a decision at the 2005 Review Conference to make annual reports a permanent feature of Treaty implementation efforts. Canada commends the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date, and would encourage them to submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report.

Step 13

23. In early 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada submitted a major study on weapons of mass destruction verification and compliance to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which has been published as part of the Commission's series of papers and studies and is available at www.wmdcommission.org.

Article VII

24. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While not itself a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Canada welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria. At the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported resolutions calling for the establishment or consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Article VIII

25. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 enshrined the concept of permanence with accountability. In accordance with the commitments arising from the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, Canada delivered at the third Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2005 review cycle its third report on its implementation of the Treaty. In addition, Canada presented another working paper proposing a number of ideas to carry the issue of reporting forward, building towards a decision at the 2005 Review Conference. With a view to reinforcing the authority and integrity of the Treaty, and ensuring the implementation of its obligations, Canada submitted to the third Preparatory Committee a working paper proposing ideas for overcoming the institutional deficit of the Treaty. Canada has encouraged States parties to explore these issues with the goal of a decision being reached at the 2005 Review Conference.

Article IX

26. Canada has consistently worked for the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the IAEA General Conference in September 2004, Canada reiterated its concern "that India, Israel and Pakistan continue to refuse to sign the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons States. We urge them to do so unconditionally and without delay and to place their respective fuel cycles under the IAEA safeguards system". Canada views its position in this regard as conforming with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which calls on all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

27. In 2004, at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of the resolution entitled "Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which calls upon Israel to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Canada explained its vote as follows: "Canada urges Israel, in the crucial months leading up to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to take the necessary first steps to adhering to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Canada further calls on all States in the Middle East region to comply fully with their Treaty obligations and, in this regard, urges all States in the region that have not yet done so, to sign and fully implement safeguards agreements with the IAEA." Canada views this vote as conforming to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which calls on all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Article X

28. Canada introduced a resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the September 2004 IAEA General Conference, which was adopted by consensus and which sought to promote the resumption of that country's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement. At the Conference on Disarmament on 14 March 2005, Canada's Foreign Minister said the Democratic People's Republic of Korea recent assertion that it now possesses nuclear weapons, together with its reluctance to re-engage in the Six Party Talks, underlines the grave risk to regional and international peace and security posed by that country's nuclear programme.

29. Canada welcomed the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted without a vote in 1995. Negative security assurances provided in 1995 by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as paragraph 8 of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

Article XI

N/A

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

22 April 2005

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Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by Ukraine

2004 marked the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In 1990 in the Declaration on State Sovereignty Ukraine proclaimed its intention to keep to the three non-nuclear principles set out in article II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since that time Ukraine has consistently followed a course towards nuclear-weapon-free status. One of the first significant steps in this direction was the signature of the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) (May 1992), according to which Ukraine assumed the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the aforementioned Treaty and pledged to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

After Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 5 December 1994 and the START I Treaty entered into force, Ukraine began practical implementation of its obligations under the mentioned treaties.

By 5 December 2001 Ukraine had eliminated all deployed strategic offensive arms, as required by the provisions of article II of the START I Treaty. These included:

- 130 silos for SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 46 silos for SS-24 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads (SS-19 and SS-24 were capable of carrying 6 and 10 warheads respectively);
- 44 heavy bombers (Tu-160 — 19 units, Tu-95MC — 25 units, each type equipped for 8 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles.

From 1992 to 1996 all tactical nuclear warheads and more than 1,600 strategic nuclear warheads were transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. By October 2001 all those warheads were eliminated at the relevant facilities of the Russian Federation under the monitoring of Ukrainian representatives.

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Ukraine ensured reduction of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons inherited from the former Soviet Union, having thus made an immeasurable contribution to the cause of practical nuclear disarmament.

As of today, Ukraine continues to carry out its START I obligations with regard to the non-deployed ICBMs. This process provides for completing a highly challenging task — disposition of the solid propellant from the SS-24 ICBM loaded motor cases.

Nowadays, there are 5,000 tons of the solid propellant contained in the 163 loaded motor cases of 54.5 SS-24 ICBMs at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant (Ukraine), which is to be disposed of in a safe and environmentally compliant manner.

Ukraine has embarked upon the construction of the propellant disposal facility at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant at the expense of its own State budget resources. However, the process of destroying enormous stocks of the solid propellant in Ukraine is a costly one. Therefore, despite Ukraine's efforts, it may not be able to complete the propellant disposal process by 5 December 2009 (START I expiration date), unless other States provide financial assistance to Ukraine.